The peculiar distributional character of Greek taxation system (1995-2008) and the reform that never happened

by Yiorgos Ioannidis, PhD Political Economy

Paper presented on the 19th Annual Conference on Alternative Economic Policy in Europe: The deepening divisions in Europe and the need for a radical alternative to EU policies

Abstract

The period 1995-2008 is a period of fundamental transformation for the Greek economy. The dominance of services in the GDP and the decline of manufacturing and the agriculture, the expansion of salary labor and the decline of self-employment, the strengthening of large companies versus the smaller ones, the massive influx of immigrants and women at the labour market, the economic expansion to the Balkans and to Turkey, the liberalization of the financial system, the euro, all these and many more are aspects of a transformation that has occurred during that period. So, by a first view it seems as a paradox that the structure of the taxation system and its results changed only marginally.

The explanation of the paradox lies in the peculiar distributive (as opposed to re-distributive) character of the taxation system. Namely, the fact that the government interventions during the period 1995-2008 resulted at the distribution to business elites and specific social groups of the surplus generated from the robust growth, instead of using this surplus to fund a reform of the taxation system aiming at a fairer distribution of the tax burden. Thus, the uneven tax burden carried by employees and pensioners was not only maintained but further strengthened. Unfortunately, the combination of tax agenda of the conservative party in government (Nea Dimocratia) along with a populist discourse of the opposition did not allow the promotion of the so needed tax reform.

The peculiar distributional character of the taxation system, 1995-2010

Despite a widely held belief, the Greek state is not an expensive one. As shown in Figure 1, public expenses as a percentage of GDP in Greece do not exceed Eurozone's average. So, even though public expenses in Greece are quite inefficient, poorly targeted and distributed in an unproductive way,[1] their volume is not particular exorbitant according to Eurozone standards. The real problem lies on the revenues. Greek state's public revenues are constantly less than its expenses and way below the Eurozone average (Figure 2). In that sense, the Greek fiscal problem is a problem of poor revenues and not one of excessive expenses (Figure 3). That is why the structure and the function of the taxation system in Greece are of a major importance.

Figure 1: Total general government expenditure
% of GDP



source: Eurostat

Figure 2: Total general government revenue
% of GDP



source: Eurostat

Figure 3: Total general government expenditure & revenue, Greece
% of GDP



source: Eurostat

---

1 According Förster & Pearson (2002: 31), the poorest 30% of the Greek population receive only the 20.9% of social transfers, the middle 40% receive the 37.7% and the richer 40% receive the 41.5%. In general social transfers in Greece decrease the poverty rate only by 6% (EU average is 20%) (Dafermos & Papatheodorou 2010: 11). Manatis finds that the redistributive effect of the net social wage in Greece is almost zero (Maniatis 2003). For an overview see Ioannidis 2012.

Regarding the public revenues, the years from 1995 to 2008 are divided into two periods. During the first period (1995-2000), it was observed a strong enhancement of public revenues. During that period the main objective of the economic policy was to fulfill the Maastricht convergence criteria in order for the country to enter the Eurozone. So, for the first time since 1980 the total receipts from taxes and social contributions (after deduction of amounts assessed but unlikely to be collected) exceeded the 30% of GDP reaching the 39.6% of the GDP in 1999 (compared to 34.7% in 1995).

The increased revenues came mainly from income taxes. In the year 2000 the corporate income tax yielded €5.7 billion (4.1% of GDP) compared to €2.3 billion in 1995 (2.6% of GDP). In the case of the individual/household income tax, revenues increased from 4.1% of GDP in 1995 to 5.0% in 2000 almost entirely due to the abolishment of several family tax allowances (Manesiotis & Reischauer, 2002). The revenues from VAT simply followed the growth of consumption (6.8% in 2000 from 5.6% of GDP in 1995) reflecting the inability to combat shadow economy and improve the collection of VAT.

In short, the increased revenues of the first period (1995-2000) were not the result of a successful strategy to combat tax evasion or of a permanent and sustainable situation resulting from a tax reform. The extra revenues came from the economic growth which increased profits, from the expansion of salary labour, from the abolishment of a number of tax exemptions of social nature, from the increased revenues from privatization and from the increased inflow of European funds. During 1995-2000 more taxes were collected but in a way resembling in an peculiar "pre-deposit" in the name of the national effort to enter the euro.

Immediately after the entrance in the Eurozone and as a result of political choice there was a sharp decline in the revenues. The pattern of that decline was almost identical with the one of the previous increase. The governments of PASOK (socialists) and Nea Dimocratia (conservatives) after 2001 reduced gradually the corporate income tax-rate from 45% in 1995 to 21% in 2004 (Figure 4).[2] From 2004 to 2010, revenue from corporate taxation decreased sharply from 46% of total income taxes to 28.7% (or from 4.1% of GDP in 2000 to 2.5% in 2008).[3] Thus, the implicit tax rate of corporate income in Greece (18.6%) remained at levels well below the Eurozone average (27.8%).

[2] Laws 2238/94, 2992/02, 3091/02, 3296/04, 3220/04, 3427/05, 3453/06, 3483/06, 3517/06, 3522/06, 3634/08, 3697/08

[3] The largest decrease took place during the conservative governments (2004-2008), when income tax revenue from corporations fell in absolute terms by 1.3% despite the fact that the profits increased by 35.2%.

On the other hand, revenues from VAT increased slightly (6.8% of GDP in 2000, 7.1% in 2008) despite the multiplication of the private consumption while the tax burden of the households remained stable (5% of GDP in 1995, 4.8% in 2008).

Figure 4: Corporate income tax rate



Nonetheless, it should be noted that the inner structure of taxes collected from households changed at the expense of the salary earners and the pensioners. During the period 2002-2008 the participation of employees and pensioners in personal income tax revenues increased from 49% to 55%, while the participation of the professions, merchants, farmers, craftsmen and industry fell from 51% to 45%.

There are three factors that made possible the above mentioned reductions.

The first one is the state's ability to borrow more and at better terms. Due to euro, the Greek governments not only could borrow at a lower interest rate but also they could stretch the repayment time over a longer period (for more details see Argeitis et. al., 2011). Indeed, the average long-term nominal interest rate decreased from 20.7% in 1994 to 3.6% in 2005 while the average debt maturity rose from 1.6 years in 1994 to 10.5 years in 2005.

The second factor was the robust growth of the period. During the years from 1995 to 2008 the Greek real GDP annual growth rate was 3.6%, way above the Eurozone average (Figure 5). Growth means increased incomes/profits and increased incomes/profits yield more tax revenues. Nonetheless, instead of using the extra revenue to reduce the debt, successive Greek governments chose to maintain the debt at levels considered manageable in order to reduce the corporate taxation and tolerate tax-evasion. That is why despite the intense growth after 1995 the public debt continued to fluctuate close to 110% of the GDP.

Figure 5: Real GDP growth, 1995=100



source: Eurostat

The third factor that permitted the reduction of corporate taxation and the tolerance of tax-evasion was the significant expansion of the salary labour. During the period 1995-2008 the salary earners increased from 54% of the total employment to 65%. Given the fact that "salary-earners do not evade" the increase of their number created a short of broadening the tax base which by tern increased the revenue from the personal income tax. During the period 2002-2008 the nominal revenues from personal income tax increased twice as fast compared with the nominal increase of the total revenues (15% vs. 7%).

In conclusion, governmental interventions in the tax field during the period 1995-2008 were highly distributive –and not redistributive– since the result was the distribution of the surplus resulting from growth among business elites but also among extensive but nonetheless quite specific social groups. As far as the adequate financing of the state budget was insured, the surplus resulting from the robust economic growth of the period did not fund the reduction of the debt but the reduction of corporate tax rate as well as the tolerance of tax evasion of specific societal groups. For this reason, the fluctuations of the level of tax revenues over the period 1995-2008, are only marginally associated with the economic cycle (Manesiotis & Reischauer, 2002) but closely related to the electoral one (Christodoulakis & Skouras, 2009).

In short, tax avoidance and tax evasion from almost everybody except the salary-earners and the pensioners has grown into a structural feature of the Greek taxation system characterizing the higher as well as the lower income brackets. Some, such as the high prestige professionals (like doctors, layers etc.) and the self-employed evade due to their increased ability to hide their true incomes;[4] others, such as the farmers and the engineers due to the institutionalized understatement of their earnings;[5] managers and executives due to the autonomous taxation of their income; the big corporations due to the 500 tax-exemptions;[6] the small and medium enterprises through a scheme of self-calculating their tax obligation (aftopereosi) and so on. Throughout the period 2002-2008 around 86% of the self-employed and the farmers declared annual incomes of less than €10,000 (in 2002 prices – Figure 6). For these categories of employed it seems that the economic growth had no positive effect in terms of income(!) Another indicator of the size of tax evasion is the distribution by origin of the high income earners: according the tax statements of the year 2010 wage-labour is the source of taxable income for the 50% of those who stated declared above 150.000€ and 40% of those who declared more than €500,000(!) Like elsewhere, there are also in Greece a number of highly paid

---

[4] For estimations on the tax evasion of every occupational group see Artavanis et. al., 2012; Matsaganis & Flevotomou, 2010.

[5] rural income is taxed based on assumptions on its level which are close to the one third of the real level; the construction sector pays VAT not according the real cost but according to the "objective values" or to the "minimal cost in building" which are given prizes way below the actual market prices

[6] Therefore, as Stathakis mentions the problem of low tax revenues is not only due to tax evasion but also due to the extensive legal tax exceptions (Stathakis, 2011). For the tax evasion of big corporation see Kanellopoulos, 2002.

employees, however, the fact that they constitute 40% of the people who declare annual income more than half million euros is a world class phenomenon.

Figure 6: Declared earnings by different occupational groups



source: Ministry of Economics, Statistical Bulletin of Taxation.

The crucial point is that this situation ensured broad social consensus because the sources of income of a narrow majority of the population were (and still are) highly fragmented and self-employment remains at high levels (for the relation among self-employed and shadow economy see Williams, 2010; Tanzi, 1999; ILO, 2002). So, while not everybody profited the same, those who were profited even a bit were not few. The big losers of this tax policy were the employed, the pensioners, the unemployed and in general the poorest groups of the society. There were the ones who were "paying the marble" but also were deprived by the so-needed services of a welfare state which ultimately never thrived because the ones how could pay for it didn’t.

The necessary reform that never happened

Given the above, there are several reasons making necessary the reform of the taxation system in Greece. Firstly, there is a justified demand for a fair distribution of the tax burden among the different population groups. Secondly, strengthening the welfare state and also restoring the balance among public spending and revenues should derive primarily from revenue growth rather than from cost-cutting.

The third reason has to do with the recession of the Greek economy itself. Given that no recession was successfully dealt with austerity policies and since either external borrowing either printing money is feasible, the real question concerns the sources capable to fund a development program. Leaving aside what is necessary at a European level (i.e. issuing a Eurobond or printing money by the ECB), the only domestic policy to “invent” funds is the reallocation of the existing spending as well as tax enhancing. In other words, a tax reform could promote not only a fairer redistribution of tax-burden but also the “discovering” of “new” funds for public investment funding.

In that sense, tax reform in Greece is necessary not only for social reasons but also for economic ones since it can be an integral part of a progressive exit strategy from the crisis. However, the tax agenda of the conservative party in government (Nea Dimocratia) in conjunction with a populist discourse from the opposition didn't allowed the promotion of this so badly needed reform. There are two examples: the new system of income taxation (Law 4110/2013) and the controversy over the taxation of real estate.

The new system of income taxation

It is a common assumption in Greece that the main problem of the previous taxation system was the numerous special tax regimes. A large amount of personal and corporate income is not been taxed at all due to tax-exceptions or it is under-taxed due to autonomous taxation –meaning not taking account other possible incomes.

Based on the above, the proper solution would be the taxation of the total taxable income by the same progressive taxation scale (Rapanos, 2012; Hellenic Economic Chamber, 2010). Instead, the government chose the abolition of the taxation scale for everybody except the employees and the pensioners. Law 4110/2013 introduces a new way of taxing income which differentiates taxation (and tax rates) according to the income source. Unlike the past, when there was one tax scale and many exceptions, today there are as many many exceptions (all retained) and five different modes of taxation: other for employees and pensioners, other for farmers, other for self-employed and entrepreneurs, other for income from rents, other on income from securities.

With the new mode of taxation, as shown in Table 1, the tax burden on higher incomes (over €50,000) is been reduced for everybody except the employees. It is well known that the multiplication of the modes of taxation favor the wealthier income groups because they exhibit greater variety of sources of income (taxing two "packages" of 50,000€ yields less revenue than taxing one "package" of 100,000 €). For example, during the year 2010 about 39,000 people declared income of over €100,000 with an average personal income of €149,000. These people if they were to be taxed according the taxation scale of the salary-earners they would have to pay about €54,000. But by being taxed on the basis of the source of their income they will pay only 42,000€ i.e. 22% less tax.

However, taxing income according its source benefits not only the wealthiest income groups but also an extended group of taxpayers (constituting almost 29% of the taxable population): those who have income coming from rents (this income is also been taxed with another set of tax rates).[7] For example, a taxpayer with annual income of €24,000 of which €12,000 generating from rents and the rest generating from salary labour, will pay tax of €1,570.[8] If the same amount of income is generating entirely from salaries he/she will have to pay tax of €3,390. On the

[7] 10% for income up to 12,000 euro and 33% for income exceeding 12,000 euro.
[8] Income up to 9,000 euro generating through salary labour or pensions is subject to taxation.

contrary, a taxpayer with income of €9,000 of which €4,500 from rents will pay tax of €450. If the same amount of income was entirely due to salary labour he/she would not have to pay any tax. In short words, the new system of taxing income from rents produces a direct transfer of funds from the poorest income groups to the middle ones with the ultimate aim ensuring their political tolerance to the new system. In the case of a tax payer who is working part time (or a pensioner with a low pension) and complements his/her income with a low rent-income will have to pay more tax due. On the contrary, a middle income tax payer with higher salary and higher earnings from rents will pay considerably less tax.

Table 1: Impact of the new system of taxation of personal income by occupational group

Professional group	In comparison with the previous mode of taxation	
	Increased tax	Reduced tax
Salary earners with income…	…over €26,000. (20% of the salary earners)	…from €5,000 to €26,000
Professionals & self –employed with income…	…up to €57,000 (97% of the self-employed)	…over των €57,000
Farmers with income…	…up to €22,000 (98% of the farmers)	…over των €22,000
Income from rents…	…up to €50,000	…over των €50,000
Income from multiple sources…	…up to €9,000.	…over των €9,000.
Income from stocks & bonds	All taxpayers with income from loyalties, stocks or bonds are paying less tax due to reduced tax rate (from 25% to 10%)	

The same distorted logic applies on the taxation of the self-employed. It is well known that in Greece –as elsewhere– the self-employed tax-evade in a higher degree than the rest of the tax-payers due to their enhanced ability to hide income from the tax authorities (Schneider, 2011). Nonetheless the government in order to amplify the tax revenues from the self-employed did not engage a strategy to combat tax-evasion through measures aiming at specifying the real incomes. Contrariwise, the government chose to tax the already declared income at a higher rate. The new system treats the self-employed as companies,[9] meaning that onwards the self-employed will be taxed according to their net profits (income minus expenses) at a

[9] Except the economic issues this taxation mode raises significant ethical questions. Literally there is no such thing as a "poor company" but there are poor self-employed; a person might bankrupt but he/she can never "close down" – a company can; a company does not have "protective members of the households" as a person have; the income according to which one is entitled for benefits is not the same thing with the profit and so on.

rate of 21% (up to income of €50,000). But, 21% is high tax rate if applied to low incomes (i.e. €10,000) and a low tax rate if applied to higher incomes (i.e. €45,000). The new system of self-employed taxation penalizes the ones who were declaring their true incomes in favor of the ones that were tax-evading. A self-employed with true declared income up to €30,000 will pay more tax. On the contrary, someone who was hiding income will also pay more but, at the bottom line, considerably less than he/she should have. Finally, the highlight of the new system is the taxation of agricultural income with a flat rate of 13% regardless the size of the income. Small farmers and landholders will pay tax under the same tax rate.

In conclusion, the new taxation system favors the higher income groups but makes significant concessions to the middle income groups as well. Under the new system the wealthiest groups, the self-employed and the shop-owners who were tax-evading, as well as the farmers, are being favored. The ones who were tax-evading "a bit" will pay more tax but not as much as they should, and the ones who were declaring everything will pay considerably highest taxes. This is due to the fact that the new system instead of incorporate procedures to incommode income hiding it chooses to tax the under-declared income at higher rates.

The taxation of real estate

The land taxation is another example of the political economy of the Greek taxation system. It is well known that for historical reasons the ownership of the real-estate in Greece is not as much consecrated as in Western or Central Europe. Nonetheless, the dispersion of the real-estate ownership is neither as high as it is believed to be.

Figures from the Ministry of Finance show the total value of urban property of the individuals is close to €520 billion, of business is close to €250 billion while the value of the rural parcels is around 300 and 500 billion euros. Therefore, the total value of private owned land in Greece is close to one trillion euros. Putting aside the fact that until today the Greek state does not know the exact value and allocation of the rural parcels, when it comes to private owned urban land we know that the 34% of the owners is holding the 74% of the total land value, while the richest 2% of the owners (property over €500.000) is holding the 20% of the total land value (Table 2).

However, the tax revenues from real estate up until 2009 were extremely low at around 350-400 million euros per year. Given the false wide-spread belief that land ownership is highly fragmented it was argued that by not taxing the real-estate the state is implementing a short of social policy in favor of the majority of the small-owners. Nonetheless, the available data show beyond any doubt that the under-taxation of real estate was not part of a social policy but a way to favor the big landowners (among them is the Church) who own the bulk of the land value. A policy aiming at protecting small owners would exclude from taxation a certain amount of value (i.e. €50,000 or €100,000) and would tax the rest. Instead of that, all the land-value was under-taxed.

Table 2: Distribution according its value of the private held by individuals urban real estate		
	% of persons	**% of urban real estate**
from €0.01 to €300,000	**94,8%**	**67,4%**
Out of which…		
from 0.01 to 50,000€	49,8%	12,3%
from €50,000.01 to €100,000	24,4%	18,8%
from €100,000.01 to €200,000	15,8%	23,7%
from €200,000.01 to €300,000	4,8%	12,6%
over €300,000	**5,2%**	**32,6%**
Out of which over €1,000,000	0,5%	8,5%
Source: Ministry of Finance		

Under the pressure to boost revenues, the Papademos administration (PASOK-socialists, with the support of Nea Dimocratia-conservatives and the nationalistic LAOS – Popular Orthodox Rally) accepted the obligation rise annual property taxation in from 400 million euros to €3 billion. Once again, this happened in a "special" way. The government chose to tax only buildings connected to the electricity network, therefore the tax-weight fell on housing taxation. Since these buildings constitute only a small portion of the total property (approximately €500 billion) the charge was quite big (over €600 for houses of 100 square meters), while the absence of special provisions for the unemployed associated with the penalty of a power-cut in the event of non-payment attributed a particularly onerous feature to that taxation measure.

Due to the social reactions, the new coalition government that emerged from June's 2012 elections (Nea Dimkratia with the supported of PASOK and Democratic Left), pledged to introduce another way of land taxation who would replace the previous one. The aim was to derive the same amount of revenue by widening the tax base and thus by lowering the tax-weight of the poorest. In theory, this would have worked in favor of the small-residential property owners, while farmers and small-parcel owners would have to pay only a few euros. On the contrary, the losers' would be the big landowners and the holders of high value urban real estate.

The technical committee, established to elaborate a proposal, proposed the inclusion to the taxation of the ecclesiastical and monastic property, introduced an un-taxable value of 50,000-100,000 euros and proposed the exception of the unemployed and other specific groups from the taxation. According to the committee proposals, the new land tax regime would have yield the same amount of tax but at the same time 90% of homeowners would have to pay from 50% to 95% less tax than they did with the previous system.

However, the committee's proposals ran into powerful interests. Prominent member of the Parliament, mainly coming from the conservative party (like Mr. Mitsotakis, Paulopoulos and Voridis)strongly opposed the proposals; the biggest private TV station of the country started a crusade against the new taxation scheme; the Hellenic Property Federation demonstrated its preference to the previous law; even the Left main opposition party addressed a Parliamentary Question to the Prime Minister under the title "Property tax: from income theft in the confiscation of property of citizens". In the name of "employees and pensioners" there was promoted an agenda of tax-exception of the richest 3% of Greek society (that is the ones how would contribute more than 80% of the total revenues of the tax proposed by the technical committee). At the end, the Ministry of Finance rejected the proposals using Troika as a scapegoat and chose a flat rate reduction of 10% on the tax that every tax-payer had to pay.

The political economy of the Greek taxation system: final comments

That the Greek tax system is unfair and inefficient is well documented. Nonetheless, what usually escape our attention is the fact that its stability is attributed to the fact that it relies on a wide social alliance including not only powerful business elites but also extended societal groups, especially those of the self-employed, the prestigious scientific professionals (like lawyers, doctors, mechanics etc.) and the farmers. The common feature of this alliance is the persistent under-taxation which they enjoy, an under-taxation resulting on the over-taxation of the employees and the pensioners.

It is important to stress that the privileged of that system are not necessarily rich. A coffee-shop owner in the small island of Ikaria may earn the same amount of money as a bank clerk; but it most probable –almost certain– that the former has paid fewer taxes than the latter (for the same amount of real income). Consequently, the clear class-structure of the taxation system cannot be described according to an outdated division among the "rich" on the one hand and the "people" on the other. This class-structure penetrates the "people" and places each and every one in a place according the level and the sources of income. Therefore we have as many tax-consciences as income sources. Given that, the fragmentation of taxation does not help the development of a common tax consciousnes

The structural transformation of the Greek economy during the last 20 years, the expansion of salary labour, the entrance into the Eurozone and the reduced cost of borrowing this created, paradoxically renewed the capabilities of tax-exception, tax-avoidance or simply tax evasion of the wealthiest groups of the population and protected the small, medium and high privileges established on the past. Of course, this policy resulted on higher tax inequality at the expense of the salary earners and the pensioners. Unfortunately, the governmental interventions of the last 3 years did not take any action in changing the above mentioned features. Today, the Greek taxation system is as unfair and undefined as it were. The only difference is that the overall taxation burden was almost doubled.

Addressing these problems and trying to yield higher tax revenues after five years of deep recession is even more difficult because in the meantime additional issues have been raised.

To start with, the tax reform is much delayed. After five years of continuous recession a significant part of the accumulated wealth has been used not to mention that tax-evasion begins to acquire features of a survival mechanism rather than wealth-producing. Secondly, the implementation of unjust measures such as horizontal cuts in wage, pension or social benefits question the intentions of the government. Thirdly, to juxtapose the few social groups that continue to support the conservative government is not an easy choice. Finally, the political polarization is not conducive to developing a dispassionate dialogue.

The study of modern Greek history demonstrated that the Greek politics are being characterized by an intense discursive polarization which is resulting at the development of a so called “identity politics” as opposed to “issue politics” (Voulgaris; 2005). In this context, the big political parties, no matter their ideology, does not mainly express social alliances according the preferred solution in a number of issues. Instead, they tend to formulate cleavages based on a collective political identity (the Left Vs. the Right, the Good Vs. the Corrupted, the patriots Vs. the traitors and so on) which cut across the social classes. In this setting a highly polarized political discourse plays the outmost significant role.

The big political parties tend to internalize the tensions originating from the different agendas and social/class interests and try to address these tensions internally. Conflicts on issues relating to the production sphere, to the distribution of wealth or to the distribution of power among different societal groups or classes tend to be solved in an inner-party way. In other words, the political party’s ability to govern depend primarily on their ability to address under internal persuaders the economic-social conflicts and then “export” the solutions given in a form of state politics (Ioannidis, 2012). In that sense, the political parties play a role equivalent to the one Poulantzas attributed to the state: the hierarchical integration of conflicting interests (Poulantzas, 2001; Jessop 1985). The ultimate outcome is that the political party is been transformed into society and society into a political party. The clientistic character of the political system is instrumental due to its ability to strength the capacity to consolidate conflicting interests. The peculiar distributional nature of the Greek taxation system can be seen as the result of a policy promoting the neoliberal economic agenda and at the same time maintaining strong clientistic relationships.

References

Agreitis G., Dafermos Y., Nikolaidi M. (2011), The Debt Crisis in Greece, INE-GSEE, Athens (in Greek) [Original Title: Αργείτης Γ., Δαφέρμος Γ., Νικολαϊδη Μ. (2011), *Κρίση χρέους στην Ελλάδα: Αιτίες και προοπτικές,* ΙΝΕ – ΓΣΕΕ, Αθήνα]

Artavanis N., Morse A., Tsoutsoura M. (2012), "Tax Evasion Across Industries: Soft Credit Evidence From Greece", *Chicago Booth Paper No. 12-25*, Fama-Miller Center for Research in Finance.

Christodoulakis N., Skouras S. (2009), "Electoral Law-bending cycles: Wildfires and tax evasion in Greece", Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens

Dafermos Y. Papatheodorou Ch. (2010), "Macroeconomic Environment and poverty", INE-GSEE (in Greek) [Original Title: Δαφέρμος Γ., Παπαθεοδώρου Χ. (2010), «Μακροοικονομικό περιβάλλον, ανισότητα και φτώχεια. Μια εμπειρική διερεύνηση για την επίδραση της οικονομικής μεγέθυνσης και της κοινωνικής προστασίας σε Ελλάδα και ΕΕ», στο Παρατηρητήριο Φτώχειας, Εισοδημάτων και Κοινωνικού Αποκλεισμού, Η φτώχεια στην Ελλάδα στα πρόθυρα της κρίσης του 2010.]

Economic Chamber of Greece (2010), Proposals for the reform of the taxation system (in Greek) [Original Title: Οικονομικό Επιμελητήριο της Ελλάδας (2010), *Προτάσεις για την αναμόρφωση του φορολογικού συστήματος,* Αθήνα]

Förster M., Pearson M. (2002), "Income Distribution and Poverty in the OECD Area: Trends and Driving Forces", OECD Economic Studies, No. 34, 2002/1

ILO, (2002), Decent work and the informal economy, Geneva: International Labour Office

Ioannidis Y. (2012), The Political Economy of the Greek Employment Policy, 1995-2008: the European context and the national transformations, PhD thesis, University of Crete, Dept. of Economics

Jessop B. (1985), Nikos Poulantzas. Marxist Theory and Political Strategy, MacMillan Press.

Kannelopoulos K.N. (2002), *Tax-evasion in Corporations of the Greek Exchange Market,* Venter of Research and Economic Sourveys (in Greek) [Original Title: Κανελλόπουλος Κ.Ν. (2002), *Φοροδιαφυγή στις ανώνυμες εταιρίες: Εκτιμήσεις από τις εισαχθείσες στο Χρηματιστήριο Αξιών Αθηνών,* Κέντρο Προγραμματισμού και Οικονομικών Ερευνών, Αθήνα]

Manesiotis V., Reischauer R. (2002), «Fiscal Policy in Greece and the Eurozone", in R. Bryant, N. Garganas, G. Tavlas (eds.) *Economics Perfomance and Prospects of Greece*, Bank of Greece and the The Brookings Institute, Athens, p.p..129-188 (in Greek), [Original Title: Μανεσιώτης Β., Reischauer R.(2002), «Η δημοσιονομική πολιτική στην Ελλάδα και η ΟΝΕ», στο Ralph Bryant, Νικόλαος Γκαργάνας, Γεώργιος Τάβλας (επιμ.) *Οικονομικές Επιδόσεις και Προοπτικές της Ελλάδος*, Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος και The Brookings Institute, Αθήνα 2002, σ.129-188]

Maniatis Th. (2003), "The net social wage in Greece 1958-95", International Review of Applied Economics, 17:4, 377-398

Matsaganis M., Flevotomou M. (2010), "Distributional Implications of Tax Evasion in Greece", *GreeSE Paper No 31*, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe.

Poulanzas N. (2001), *State, Power, Socialism* (in Greek) [Original Title: Πουλαντζάς Ν. (2001), Το Κράτος, η Εξουσία, ο Σοσιαλισμός (πρώτη έκδοση στα Γαλλικά, 1978), Θεμέλιο]

Rapanos V. (2012), "Tax reform: Tax Administration and Social Environment", speech on the seminar Thematic Circles of Discussion, University of Athens (in Greek) [Original Title: Ράπανος Β. (2012), «Φορολογική μεταρρύθμιση: Φορολογική Διοίκηση και Κοινωνικό περιβάλλον», Παρουσίαση (Τετάρτη 28/11/2012) στα πλαίσια του σεμιναρίου *Θεματικοί κύκλοι διαλόγου και προβληματισμού* που διοργανώνει το Πανεπιστήμιο Αθήνας, http://elearn.elke.uoa.gr/etvedu/parousiaseis/forologiko_sistima_28-11-2012.pdf]

Schneider F. (2011), "The Shadow Economy and Shadow Economy Labor Force: What Do We (Not) Know?", Johannes Kepler University of Linz and IZA Discussion Paper No. 5769, June 2011

Stathakis Y. (2011), "The fiscal crisis of the Greek economy" on *Economic Crisis and Greece*, Greek Scientific Association of Political Economy (in Greek) [Original Title: Σταθάκης Γ. (2011), «Η δημοσιονομική κρίση της ελληνικής οικονομίας», στο *Οικονομική κρίση και Ελλάδα*, Επιστημονική Εταιρία Πολιτικής Οικονομίας, Gutenberg, Αθήνα 2011]

Tanzi, V. (1999), Uses and Abuses of Estimates of the Underground Economy, *Economic Journal* 109/3, 338-347.

Voulgaris Y. (2005), The Greece of Metapoliteysi, 1974-1990 (in Grrek) [Original Title: Βούλγαρης Γ. (2005), *Η Ελλάδα της Μεταπολίτευσης, 1974-1990*. Εκδ. Θεμέλιο (γ' έκδοση), Αθήνα].

Williams C. C. (2010), "Beyond the market/non-market divide: a total social organization of labour approach, International Journal of Social Economics, 37,6, 402–14.