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EU socio-economic policy in the face of the challenges of the struggle for a new world division

Introduction

The Euromemorandum Group was founded in the mid-1990s to counter the then dominant TINA thesis (*"there is no alternative."* for neoliberal capitalism and liberal democracy) and indicate the necessity and possibility of formulating alternative social and economic development projects for the EU. In seeking to demonstrate the assumptions of an Alternative Economic Policy in Europe, we have tacitly assumed that the world order is shaped politically by the world-dominating United States, while economically it is based on a liberalised global exchange of information and globally operating financial and commodity markets. Under such circumstances, the Euromemorandum Group's efforts focused on determining what economic policies should serve *„to promoting full employment with good work, social justice with an eradication of poverty and social exclusion, ecological sustainability, and international solidarity."*

However, in the nearly 30 years of the Euromemorandum Group's existence, the political and economic conditions under which the EU's socio-economic policies may be conducted have changed significantly. In order to take this into account, it is necessary today to consider what impact this may have on the content and nature of the alternative economic policies proposed to the EU. As it seems, the most significant changes that have taken place in the shape of the global political and economic system can be brought down to:

- The undermining of the dominant political position of the USA in the world and the emergence on the world stage of countries pretending to take on the role of global powers competing with the USA and the broader Western countries, both economically and in terms of the proposed socio-political model¹.

- The increasing tendency for nation states to regain control of international economic linkages (primarily due to the strategic consequences of dependence on uncertain and volatile international markets) and the associated erosion of the liberal-based global economic order.

- As a result of the threats posed by climate change, the questioning of the paradigm of unlimited economic growth and the growing influence of the need to take climate and environmental objectives into account on the shape and nature of economic policies

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¹A. Jash, *The Emerging Role of BRICS in the Changing World Order*, indrastra.com/2017/06/PAPER-The-Emerging-Role-of-BRICS-in-the-Changing-World-Order-003-06-2017-0054.html

implemented in the major countries of the global economic system ¹. This change has been strongest in the countries of Europe and in the economic policy of all of European Union as a whole. To a lesser extent, climate and environmental threats affect the economic policy of the USA and China and are almost completely disregarded in the economic policy of Russia and much of the South, where the pursuit of rapid economic growth is still of decisive importance.

- The rise and expansion in many countries of far-right and populist political movements, on the one hand rejecting the very existence and rationalistic explanations of such global threats as global warming and the climate crisis or the Covid pandemic and the ability of democratic systems to solve them, and on the other proposing a return to systems based on traditional (often religious) values, with strong leadership and authoritarian or even totalitarian character.

The new political situation in the global economy

Not so long ago, it might have seemed that the main problem in international relations on a global scale was the aspiration of Europe and the United States to impose Eurocentric political, economic and social rules and values on the whole world. In political terms, these were expressed in a model of liberal parliamentary democracy and in respect for the principles of tolerance and human rights. In global economic terms, it was understood as the development of a barrier-free “free market” global economy, characterised by the free movement of goods, services and capital (after all, while maintaining restrictions on the free movement of labour); but on the scale of individual national economies, in the spread of the model of a neoliberal market economy based on the free operation of the market and minimising state intervention in the course of economic processes. Eventually, in the social sphere, the expression of these Eurocentric principles and values became an individualistically understood catalogue of human rights and the application of the principles of tolerance and respect for the rights of minorities (national, religious or sexual).

In order to impose these rules as universally valid on a global scale, the countries of the broader West have used their dominant economic and cultural as well as political and military positions. In many cases, in the face of states not complying with these rules (albeit formally independent and sovereign), direct or indirect military interference was even resorted to. Back in the 1970s and 1980s, these interferences most often consisted of financial and military support for local (mainly right-wing) political movements (this was the case with the

¹ The threats posed by climate change and the courses of action needed to confront them internationally were articulated most clearly at the Paris Climate Summit COP21, The Paris Agreement, <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement>,

overthrow of President Allende in Chile, or the support given to the mujahideen in Afghanistan). However, already in the 21st century, the liberal-democratic countries of the West have, under various pretexts, also granted themselves the right to intervene militarily in countries that do not respect liberal-democratic principles and that may pose a real or apparent threat to the global domination of the United States and the Eurocentric world order¹. The most drastic examples of such interference are the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and, on a smaller scale, the French interventions in the Sahel countries (in Mali, Chad, Niger and Mauritania).².

However, the emergence and growth of new centers of economic and political importance in the world of new centers of gravity has been increasingly evident for some time. Undoubtedly the largest and strongest of these is China; On a smaller scale, India and, to some extent, Brazil aspire to be such global powers. Russia is also trying to play a special role in the formation of a new division of influence on a global scale. In the first period after the collapse of the USSR, it may have seemed that Russia would join the world-dominant United States and the so-called Western states and be one component of the world-dominant liberal-democratic political and economic order. However, under V. Putin, Russia's policy has begun to move towards regaining its role as an independent world power, competitive with the West. While China bases its superpower ambitions (at least for now) mainly on increasing its economic significance on a global scale, for Russia (in view of the weakness of its economy), the main tool for regaining its superpower status and expanding its sphere of influence has been its military strength and its role as a strategic supplier of energy resources. The most recent and drastic, and worthy of the utmost condemnation, expression of such a policy was Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine aimed at halting its aspirations for EU integration and its economic and political incorporation into the Russian sphere of influence.

In parallel to their rise to political prominence, the pretenders to the role of the “new” powers deny the universal character of liberal-democratic principles and norms for the functioning of society. This applies both to the generally understood principles of freedom, tolerance, and human rights, as well as to the rules of international exchange based on economic liberalism. As a consequence, they use rather authoritarian or even autocratic

¹ I. Wallerstein, *European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power*, New York 2006: New Press, Polish edition: *Europejski uniwersalizm. Retoryka władzy*. Warszawa: Scholar, 2007

² A. Fligel, *The Global Peace Philosophy. The Right to Intervene – a Case Study*, International Studies. Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal Vol. 27, No. 1/2021, 215–235, <https://doi.org/10.18778/1641-4233.27.13>

political solutions in their internal economic and political arrangements, combined with an economy that is illiberal but strongly shaped by the state and its associated oligarchic structures.

In addition to changes in the balance of political and economic power, the possibility of shaping a new world order is conditioned by such phenomena as:

- The increase in economic interdependence between countries as a consequence of globalisation processes and the associated emergence of global logistics and supply chains¹ and the growth in size and economic importance of international exchanges of goods, capital and services, often including goods and services of strategic importance for the development and sovereignty of individual states to act.
- The development of new technologies for collecting, processing and using information, referred to as the ICT (information and communications technologies) revolution, leading to unmanageable global information networks². In addition to a number of consequences beneficial to economic development, the ICT revolution may also give rise to threats to autonomy and sovereignty and even to the conduct of democratic and wider political processes in individual countries, thus becoming a tool of political and economic aggression.
- The emergence of new (or at least previously unacknowledged) global threats to human development linked to the process of climate change and the earth's ecological imbalance.

New rules for organising the international order are needed.

The shift in the balance of power outlined here and on a global scale will have to bring about changes in both the aims and methods of shaping the international economic and political order and in the internal socio-economic policies pursued in the Western countries in general and the countries of the European Union in particular.

¹ J. Witkowski, *Globalne i lokalne strategie logistyczne w międzynarodowych łańcuchach dostaw [Global and local logistics strategies in international supply chains]*, Management Sciences No. 2(31), Year 2017, https://www.dbc.wroc.pl/Content/40371/Witkowski_Globalne_i_Lokalne_Strategie_Logistyczne_w_Miedzynarodowych_2017.pdf and : de Koster, M.B.M. René and Shinohara, M., Supply-Chain Culture Clashes in Europe. Pitfalls in Japanese Service Operations (February 6, 2006). ERIM Report Series Reference No. ERS-2006-007-LIS, Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=902736>

² The nature and multiple consequences of the economic and social changes brought about by the development of new information technology are discussed in: *The ICT Revolution. Productivity Differences and the Digital Divide*, Edited by D. Cohen, P. Garibaldi, and S. Scarpetta, 2004, and in: Jorgenson, Dale W., and Khuong M. Vu. "The ICT Revolution, World Economic Growth, and Policy Issues." *Telecommunications Policy* 40.5 (May 2016): 383-397.

In view of the formation of a global multipolar political and economic system, it seems necessary to abandon the West's desire to impose Eurocentric principles and values governing both international relations and internal socio-economic systems on the whole world. Instead, the fact of the coexistence and a certain competitiveness of many models of socio-economic development should be recognised.

The existence of such a multipolar balance of power, raises multilateral threats to the stability and ability to solve the problems facing humanity on a global scale. One of the most important is the threat of competition between the superpowers and the systems they represent turning into a series of armed conflicts and, in the worst-case scenario, into a global war waged with all available means, including nuclear weapons. This in turn could lead to the total annihilation of humanity.

With the relatively easy acceptance of the need to avoid war as a tool for gaining global advantage, it is much more debatable in what areas and what means should be allowed as tools of acceptable competition in relations between contenders for global powers. Undoubtedly, economic and social competition should therefore be allowed (Which system and which superpower can ensure a better functioning economy and higher satisfaction of the needs of its citizens?). However, doubts arise when using such economic leverage tools as technological or trade embargoes, capital, raw material or food 'blackmail', etc. Arguably, competition in terms of values and ideologies must also be acceptable. Here, however, doubts arise over the possibility of using information aggression based on the application of ICT or even artificial intelligence as its tool.

The second most serious threat posed by the multipolar system is the world's inability to take and implement the actions necessary on a global scale to halt the catastrophic course of climate change. In the face of these threats, the world is faced with the necessity of working out such rules and principles of mutual relations which, on the one hand, can be accepted and adopted by all competing centres and world powers and, on the other hand, enable cross-system cooperation in solving the global problems of mankind. As it seems, some models for this situation can be sought in the solutions adopted during the period of intensified inter-system competition (Cold War) in the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, international relations were largely based on the acceptance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, confirmed by the unanimous adoption back in 1957 of the relevant UN General Assembly resolution. It is worth recalling here that, in its original version, these principles included:

1. mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
2. mutual non-aggression,
3. mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
4. equality and mutual benefit, and
5. peaceful coexistence.

After the collapse and disintegration of the former "socialist bloc" and the USSR, these principles were no longer respected and the US and the liberal-democratic countries of the West granted themselves, in the name of "defending" universalist human rights and democratic rules, the right to interfere in the world order and in the internal affairs of other countries¹. The most drastic examples of this interference are the previously mentioned wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the embargo and economic pressure on Iran. Today, however, the most serious threat to world order and the possibility of peaceful coexistence is the attempt by Russia to interfere in the territorial integrity and internal sovereignty of Ukraine. For it is clear that in the war over Ukraine it was Russia that violated at least the first three of the principles of peaceful coexistence indicated above.

In this situation, in view of the previously indicated threats to the world order, the need arises to base it again on the principles of peaceful coexistence. These should now be supplemented by additional principles on the non-use of raw material and food blackmail and information aggression in international relations. It is also necessary to find the means and mechanisms that can induce all states aspiring to the role of a superpower to recognise that the realisation of their goals and aspirations must be within the framework resulting from adherence to these principles. This, in turn, will be achieved not through moral appeals or even through rational appeals to the global interest of humanity, but only by demonstrating the ineffectiveness of war and other tools of aggression as a means of achieving superpower political goals.

In the second half of the twentieth century, what allowed the then superpowers to accept the principles of peaceful coexistence was above all the fear of the consequences of a global nuclear conflict. Now, with the emergence of the concept of limited use of tactical nuclear weapons, it may appear that the risk of such a global conflict has been reduced, but to

¹ I. Wallerstein, *European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power*, op. cit.

a large extent this is only an apparent reassurance. Indeed, there are no guarantees or protections against the increasing escalation of the “limited use of nuclear weapons” and its transformation into a humanity-destroying global conflict. On the other hand, the United States and the West became convinced of the ineffectiveness of conventional wars (long ago in Vietnam) and more recently after the lost interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Ukraine, on the other hand, it is Russia that must recognize it today. Therefore, preventing Russia from gaining any advantage from the war it has unleashed for dominance over Ukraine is now the first and essential condition for attempts to rebuild a world order based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The belief that Russian aggression against Ukraine must be stopped has been almost universally accepted in the US and the wider Western countries. However, this is largely motivated by the defence of their interests and the democratic-liberal values they recognise, rather than an awareness of the importance this may have in shaping the principles of a future multipolar world order. In contrast, the understanding of the global consequences of Russia's aggression against Ukraine is much lower in the broader countries of the South and also in the aspiring world power China. Due to the impact that this war has on the global markets for food, fertilizers and energy resources, these countries are mainly interested in ending the conflict and restoring peace. In turn, they take much less account of the consequences of even a partial “victory” by Russia for adherence to the principles of non-interference and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the world system. From this point of view, some hope can be drawn from the peaceful initiatives of African countries and the recent peace conference in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. However, they can only have a positive impact on the future world order if they not only lead to peace, but also demonstrate that in today's world armed aggression cannot be an effective tool for achieving the goals of the superpowers. From this vantage point, the attitude of China, which, given its desire to annex Taiwan, is itself probably considering armed interference as a tool for achieving this goal, may be crucial in this regard.

In addition to making aggression ineffective as an instrument of competition between the superpowers, the condition for basing the international order once again on the modernised principles of peaceful coexistence seems to be the reconstruction of the institutions of international cooperation in such a way as to enable effective international control over the observance of these principles and to create mechanisms for the effective deterrence and even punishment of states violating these principles. This will require, first and foremost, changes in the way the UN operates in such a way that it can realistically fulfil its

role as guardian of a peaceful world order. Without attempting here to project these changes in more detail, it can nevertheless be pointed out that, in order to improve the functioning of the UN, it is necessary, first and foremost, to take into account the changed balance of political power in its structure and, in particular, in the composition of the permanent members of the Security Council, and, in order to avoid its paralysis by a single power, to introduce the principle that the right of veto enjoyed by the great powers may not be exercised in their own affairs. Of course, the necessary extent and nature of changes to the functioning of the UN would require separate consideration and discussion. Certainly, this is a particularly difficult and controversial issue and therefore one that would probably require lengthy diplomatic negotiations between all the states concerned. Nevertheless, restoring the UN to its role as a regulator of international relations appears to be a necessary condition for basing a multipolar world order on modified and supplemented principles of peaceful coexistence.

Implications for EU socio-economic policy

In view of the formation of a multipolar, political-economic world system, the objectives and tools used in the European Union's internal socio-economic policy must also change. In particular, among the tasks facing this policy, the following can be identified as priorities:

1. For external security - the need to strengthen defence efforts in the areas of military, raw materials, food and information and IT security.

Both Russia's previous military aggressions (against Georgia in 2008 and against Ukraine in 2014) and, above all, the outbreak and course of the current war for Ukraine's independence, make it clear that in a multipolar world, keeping the peace and preventing the 'new' powers from using military force to pursue their interests will become a priority task of EU policy. This requires both having an adequate military capability to effectively 'deter' potential aggressors and a strong political condemnation of such actions and not allowing military interventions (on the basis of acceptance of the status quo thus created) to benefit the aggressors, politically and/or economically. For the EU's internal policy, this implies a corresponding increase in the resources directed to strengthening military capabilities and to ensuring Europe's relative independence in such strategic sectors as the supply of raw materials and energy production, meeting food needs and the development of technology and the functioning of information and information systems. With regard to the latter, it will be important to achieve relative independence and security both in the development of software

systems and in the possession of adequate hardware capabilities, which today depend on access to critical raw materials, particularly rare earth elements.

Of course, it is important to realise that this will involve increased financial outlays from both the budgets of individual Member States and the EU budget. At the same time, the increased emphasis on security and self-sufficiency in strategic sectors is likely to lead to an increase in the costs and burdens on business and consequently a decrease in the international competitiveness of European products and services. Taken together, this will also lead to increased pressure to reduce public and private social obligations.

2. In view of the migration threat - the need to support economic and social development in the countries of the South to reduce economic migration, on the one hand, while maintaining and even increasing and remodelling support for the internal integration of political refugees and migrants, on the other hand.

Recent years have led to a growing sense of insecurity and social tensions in Europe about the consequences of the increasing influx of migrants to Europe from countries often historically and culturally distant. This phenomenon is related, on the one hand, to the difference in the level of economic development and associated levels of prosperity and, on the other hand, is a consequence of political instability and associated wars and persecutions on political, economic, ethnic or religious grounds. As a consequence of the errors in the integration policies of migrants already arriving in Europe for a long time, and as a result of the exponential increase in the size of immigration in recent years, the perception of a large part of the societies of European countries is that their capacity to receive and integrate such numbers of migrants is either close to being exhausted or has already been exceeded. This is becoming a source of growing nationalist and separatist sentiment and is creating one of the social bases for the rise in political importance of right-wing political parties and movements such as the **RN** (*Rassemblement national*), **VOX**, **RDF**, **FdI**, or Hungarian **Fidesz** and Polish **PiS**.

For the EU's socio-economic policy, this implies the need to develop and intensify measures aimed at reducing external migration pressures. At present, it is mainly caused by two types of factors.

For economic reasons, the relatively high level of welfare and a developed system of social policy in Europe means that in the societies of many Asian and African countries with a lower level of development and limited prospects for rapid advancement in civilisation, it is seen as a very attractive direction of migration, creating (despite the difficulties arising from formal and communication barriers and the need to adapt to new social and cultural

conditions) an opportunity to improve individual living standards. Stopping this pressure, it seems, is not possible in the long run either by strengthening formal barriers (for legal migration) or by creating physical barriers (such as border walls) and strengthening the protection of the EU's external borders. On the other hand, this pressure can be relieved by supporting development processes and providing migrants with prospects for advancing in civilisation in their countries of origin. This, in turn, will require an increase in the volume and effectiveness of economic aid provided by the European Union to these countries.

A second group of factors underlying the growing migratory pressures are the uncertainties and threats arising from the political situation in these countries. These can even take the form of threats to health and life associated with armed conflicts or political revolutions and upheavals, and also involve national, ethnic or religious persecution of various minorities. The European Union's defence against the migratory pressures resulting from these political factors, even in the short term, cannot, for humanitarian reasons, turn to tools of formal or physical containment of migration and in the longer term, as with economic migration, must be based on supporting economic development and political stability in these countries.

In addition to actions aimed at reducing external migratory pressures, a second direction of action in social policy should be the transformation of existing methods and tools used for the successful integration into European societies of increasing numbers of migrants from countries with different cultural (customs and religious) and political traditions. In particular, solutions must be sought which, on the one hand, prevent the emergence of immigrant ghettos and, on the other hand, also enable the next generation of immigrants to integrate fully economically and socially.

3. Ze względu na zagrożenie zmianami klimatycznymi – utrzymanie a nawet pogłębienie podjętych już przekształceń wewnętrznej polityki energetycznej i środowiskowej oraz działań na rzecz stworzenia światowych mechanizmów walki ze zmianami klimatycznymi a w szczególności wzmocnienia ekonomicznych narzędzi międzynarodowego wsparcia dla działań proekologicznych w krajach o niższym poziomie rozwoju gospodarczego.

The key objectives and courses of action in the EU's climate and energy policy were defined on the basis of the EU's climate change adaptation strategy adopted in 2021 and the submissions to the UN climate conference COP26. These have found their formalised expression in the package of measures included in the *“Fit for 55”* programme. This programme is sometimes regarded as useful by climate scientists and environmental social

movements, but it is not ambitious enough and is still insufficient. This is because, despite European and global action in this area, there is still a failure to halt increasing global warming. As the recent record may indicate, it even seems to be accelerating. This raises the concern that the earth is already dangerously approaching or has even passed the critical moment for irreversible climate change to occur.

From a political point of view, however, the European climate and environmental programme still appears to be extremely ambitious and expensive. Consequently, it is encountering resistance from parts of the Union's states, which could cause significant delays in its implementation. Additional threats to the European and global climate change containment agenda are linked to the changes in the global balance of power discussed earlier. In particular, with the intensification of competition between the superpowers, the implementation of climate policy in individual countries is being subordinated to prioritised security objectives (mainly energy) and the acquisition of strategic economic sovereignty. This leads, on the one hand, to a reduction in the resources allocated to the fight against climate change and to sustain strategically important sectors despite their negative impact on the climate and environment, on the other hand.

In this situation, in the EU's economic policy, in addition to deepening its own climate policy, one of the most important courses of action must be to support action taken in this sphere on a global scale, and not only by demonstrating a model approach to these issues, as an example to other countries, but above all by providing financial and economic support for this policy on a global scale, particularly in countries with a lower level of development, for which the implementation of climate and environmental policy poses a threat to their ambitions for development and civilisation.

4. To stem internal threats to social cohesion and the stability of democratic systems - to develop social policy mechanisms that increase the sense of social security and reduce the vulnerability of societies to false totalitarian and populist slogans and prescriptions.

The emergence and growing significance of new external threats to the European social counter is also increasing internal social and political tensions within the European Union. These are manifested in many European countries by the growing political importance of movements and political parties of a nationalist and xenophobic and, in economic terms, populist nature. This poses an increasingly serious threat to social cohesion and to the continued functioning of the European Union as an integrated socio-economic system. In this situation, the community's direction of action is to launch and intensify activities aimed at

minimizing the sources of social tensions both in individual member states and between the countries (regions) that make up the EU.

In individual countries, social tensions are mainly related to the persisting income differentiation and the scale of poverty and social exclusion, and in particular, on the one hand, the lack of prospects for promotion and full social integration for the poorest social strata (mainly immigrants), and on the other hand, with the sense of threat to their current economic and social position felt by a significant part of the lower and middle segment of the middle class. This means that in order to reduce the sources of social tensions in individual countries, it is necessary (while preserving the rights to cultural and religious distinctiveness) to implement a social policy aimed at economic and social integration of immigrant communities in the countries of their residence. At the same time, previous experience in this area shows that special attention should be paid to working towards full social integration of the second and subsequent generations of immigrants. At the same time, in order to eliminate the feeling of threat to one's social and economic position, felt by part of the hitherto middle class, social policy should focus on reducing unemployment and the growth of the precariat and unstable forms of employment, and strive to increase the scope and stability of access to state-guaranteed social services such as: education, health care, housing policy, pension security, social security, etc.

On the other hand, at the level of the entire community, apart from activities supporting national social policies, it is necessary to strengthen activities aimed at ensuring cohesion and socio-economic development of peripheral countries and regions of the EU. In particular, this applies to the countries of Central & Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans (enlargement), as well as Southern Europe. This requires, on the one hand, an increase in the funds allocated by the EU to the cohesion policy, including perhaps basing it on the common EU debt, which has so far been used only in relation to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). On the other hand, it may involve the need to soften the current policy towards the debt of member states and to abandon attempts to impose restrictive fiscal and social policies on them. An important direction of action at the EU level to improve its social cohesion may also be the expansion of community regulations and social solutions related to the implementation of the "European Pillar of Social Rights". In particular, to stop social support for separatist tendencies, it would be important to create and/or develop community tools and guarantees of social policy, such as: the minimum wage and pension guaranteed by the EU, the minimum scope of availability of health care and social assistance services for people at risk of poverty e.t.c. At the same time, in order to strengthen social acceptance for the

deepening of European integration in the social sphere, it should be considered whether, even contrary to the general principle of subsidiarity, the extension of direct and financed social policy tools at the Community level should be considered.

Summary and conclusions

In general, the changed economic and political situation on a global scale, and in particular the threats to the world order resulting from superpower and expansionist actions currently undertaken by Russia and possible in the future also by China, make it necessary for the European Union to adjust its political, economic and social agenda accordingly.

In the political and military sphere, actions should be taken to shape the future world order based on modified and extended principles of peaceful coexistence. At the same time, the EU should strive to strengthen its military and political position, necessary for effective deterrence of potential aggressors. It seems that, apart from developing cooperation within NATO with the United States, an increased defense effort of EU countries is also desirable here, as well as a return to the concept of building European armed forces.

In the economic sphere, the main direction of action should be to move away from striving to ensure high economic growth in favor of adopting the assumptions of "economy of moderation"¹. In particular, carrying out structural changes aimed at ensuring economic security, mainly energy, food and IT security, as well as contributing to the global fight against climate threats.

In the social sphere, the EU's main effort must focus on eliminating the sources of social tensions related, on the one hand, to the extent of poverty and economic and social exclusion persisting in individual countries, which become particularly acute when they concern ethnically and culturally distinctive immigrant communities. This means that it is necessary to change the current paradigm of immigrant integration policy and to adapt internal social policies in such areas as education, health care and pension security to this, so as to provide them with opportunities for social and civilizational advancement. On the other hand, measures for social cohesion in the international dimension of the EU must be

¹ „the concept of the economy of moderation focuses attention on the economic conditions of future economic growth and development, while taking into account natural, environmental, climatic, technical, institutional, sociological, political and legal constraints. The core of the economy of moderation are considerations on rationality, considered from the point of view of both an individual (single) man and a global one (the entire earthly civilization).”, M. Gorynia, *Ekonomia umiaru – nadzieje i wątpliwości [The economy of moderation - hopes and doubts]*, in: „Bankowość-rynek finansowy ; ekonomia przedsiębiorczość ; teraźniejszość i przyszłość” [banking-financial market; economics entrepreneurship ; present and future], Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2023 see also G. Kołodko, *Ekonomia umiaru - realna perspektywa? Nowy paradygmat Grzegorza W. Kołodko [The economy of moderation - a real perspective? Grzegorz W. Kołodko's new paradigm]*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2016

strengthened. They should be directed both at expanding the scope of indirectly acting EU norms and rules applied in social policy and at creating direct tools for solving the most important social problems of EU citizens.

Most of the directions of EU action indicated here will involve the need to increase the funds allocated for their implementation, both in the budgets of the member states and the budget of the entire community. One can therefore expect accusations of a lack of economic realism and/or responsibility from neoliberal circles. In order to refute these allegations, attention should be paid to the following possibilities of safely obtaining additional funds for the implementation of the economic policy objectives indicated here.

1. Consistent continuation and extension as well as increase in the amount of taxes and fees already introduced by the European Commission borne by private enterprises, including in particular:

- Excess Profits Tax - A windfall tax¹. So far, taxes of this type have been introduced only as a temporary solution in relation to the energy sector. However, their extension both temporarily and to other sectors, in particular to the financial sector, should be considered².
- Ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational enterprise groups³. Within the European Union, postulates in this regard are formulated in the Legislative Resolution of the European Parliament of 19 May 2022.⁴
- Environmental or green taxes⁵
- *carbon tax* and carbon duty and the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)¹

¹ C. Enache, *What European Countries Are Doing about Windfall Profit Taxes*, Tax Foundation, <https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/eu/windfall-tax-europe-2023/>

² Such proposals have already been put forward by some EU countries and are met with understandable skepticism in banking circles, see: *Opinion of the European Central Bank of 4 April 2023 on the imposition of a temporary solidarity contribution*, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52023AB0009>

³ OECD (2023), *Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy – Administrative Guidance on the Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two)*, July 2023, OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/tax/beps/administrative-guidance-global-anti-base-erosion-rules-pillar-two-july-2023.pdf.

⁴ European Parliament legislative resolution of 19 May 2022 on the proposal for a Council directive on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational groups in the Union, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0216_EN.html and Council Directive (EU) 2022/2523 of 14 December 2022 on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational enterprise groups and large-scale domestic groups in the Union, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2523/oj>

⁵ European Commission, Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, *Taxation in support of green transition : an overview and assessment of existing tax practices to reduce greenhouse gas emissions : final report*, Publications Office, 2021, <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2778/343194>

- Sealing of national tax systems aimed at reducing the tax gap (VAT and CIT) in individual countries and at the level of the entire community (Fight against tax fraud, tax evasion and tax havens)²

2. Taking into account the fact that the increase in public debt, both on the scale of individual Member States and within the entire community, as long as it has the character of internal debt, is only an additional tool for redistributing income from those with surpluses and directing them to the implementation of economic and social policy objectives. Thus, as long as it can be rolled and is not a source of excessive service costs, it does not in itself pose significant threats to the economic situation. This means that the emerging calls for a return to the restrictive monetary policy of the ESB and the austerity policy should be countered with the concept of an expansive monetary and fiscal policy based on the one hand on an increase in both the internal debt of individual member states and on the increase of debt limits guaranteed by the entire community³.

¹ See : *Regulation (EU) 2023/956 establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism*, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2023.130.01.0052.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2023%3A130%3ATOC

² European Parliament resolution of 21 May 2013 on Fight against Tax Fraud, Tax Evasion and Tax Havens Fight against tax fraud, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-2013-0205_EN.html

³³ The European Commission's proposals aimed at formulating new fiscal rules are heading in this direction, see: N. Giammarioli, R. Strauch, *Time to act: new fiscal rules, debt and growth sustainability*, <https://www.esm.europa.eu/articles-and-op-eds/time-act-new-fiscal-rules-debt-and-growth-sustainability> and *New economic governance rules fit for the future*, https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-and-fiscal-governance/economic-governance-review_en

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